Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Increases in NASA mission costs are well-noted but not well-understood, and there is little evidence that they are decreasing in frequency or amount over time [1] . The need to control spending leads to the analysis of the causes and magnitude of historical mission overruns, and many program control efforts are being implemented to attempt to prevent or mitigate the problem [2] . Results of these measures are only now becoming available for study, since the travel time from establishment to enforcement to outcome of such requirements is years. Evidence from the most recent mission cost data shows that the new reporting and control requirements produce indifferent results at best. For example, [3] finds that the magnitude of mission cost increases, measured as change in cost between successive milestones included in CADRe data, has no apparent correlation with launch year. At worst, the new requirements may be so cumbersome that they cost more to implement and enforce than they save. Some preliminary findings indicate that one cause of mission cost increases can be that costs associated with program management and systems engineering are estimated from historical data to which less onerous requirements applied. This bias causes 978-1-4577-0557-1/12/$26.00 ©2012 IEEE current programs to underestimate effort associated with these activities unless historical data are adjusted accordingly.
As the example above demonstrates, better insight into the causes of cost overruns helps NASA and its contracting organizations avoid them by improving cost estimating methods. However, cost overruns occur across all elements of the NASA Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), and the data show that overruns are more common in spacecraft and payload than in Project Management (PM) and Systems Engineering (SE), Figure  1 . While some direct causes of increased spending may be obvious (requirements creep, launch delays, directed changes, etc.), some examples of the impetus to spend past the original budget may be more subtle. For example, suppose a mission experienced cost growth of 36% between its Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and its launch. If it fell under the less onerous requirements of NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 7120.5C, had no launch delay and reports directed changes of only 10%, where did the remaining 26% increase come from? Several studies have been commissioned by NASA to evaluate the explanation of cost and schedule changes throughout the mission life cycle. Requirements growth, technical complexity, re-work, and inherent optimism are often cited as primary causes of cost increases. F unding instability can also play a factor in work authorization, causing projects to constantly re-plan efforts. In many of these cases, the "marching army" cost can increase as projects are pushed forward in time. This paper hypothesizes that one cause of NASA mission cost overruns is that the availability of reserves gives project team members a 'safety net' to make decisions and behave in ways that increase costs. We theorize that the presence of reserves is a contributing factor to cost overruns because it causes organizations to use their funds less efficiently or to control spending less effectively. We draw a co mparison to the economic concept of moral hazard, the phenomenon that the presence of insurance (or any form of contractually guaranteed lossindemnification) causes insureds to have more frequent and higher insurance losses [4] .
RESERVES, COST INCREASES AND MORAL

HAZARD
The terms reserve, management reserve, project reserves, and Unallocated Future Expenses (UFE) are often used interchangeably in the aerospace environment. However, they have very different meanings and structure. The planning, use and application of each term varies significantly. W e will briefly discuss these terms and approach, working from the lowest level application to the highest level discussion. A basic tenet of sound project management is that a project manager should hold reserve to accommodate "known-unknowns." That is, every project encounters anticipated costs that cannot yet be specifically identified during the planning process. In the Earned Value Management (EVM) context, this type of contingency is known as Management Reserve (MR). Management Reserve is defined as "an amount of the total allocated budget withheld for management control purposes rather than designated for the accomplishment of a s pecific task or set of tasks" [5] . The fundamental difference with this type of reserve is that it is held by the project and carved from the existing project contract budget baseline. I t is wholly controlled by the project manager and can be allocated to specific control accounts via a b aseline change request. The reserves and projectreserves and even UFE discussed in this paper are the higher level holdings that are allocated in addition to what the project has requested within the project budget. That is, the reserves are above and beyond the grass roots or parametric cost estimates generated for the completion of a specific mission. N PR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook describes project reserves management as "one of the most important functions of project management" [6] . In this context, reserves are typically applied as a percent or allocation over and above the project baseline estimate. However, these reserve amounts are readily known, spent, and understood by project teams. F urther, the NPR 7120.5 D actually provides insights and recommendations for properly planning and expending reserves dollars [7] .
Our assertion is that this can actually exacerbate cost overruns based on the project's knowledge of a "safety net". In addition to this safety net, the document further explains UFE to be "costs that are expected to be incurred but cannot yet be allocated to a specific WBS sub-element of a program's or project's plan." [8] These reserves are held at an even higher level (HQ Directorate or Agency level) than those described above. W hile these contingency allocations are critical, we examine how their known existence may impact behavior.
Moral hazard arises when an entity changes its behavior because it does not bear the full consequences of the risk that it takes on. An example is the statistical correlation between automobile insurance and auto theft. Insured cars are more likely to be stolen than uninsured cars. One reason for this is that automobile owners who have insurance are more likely to behave carelessly about locking their cars due to the presence of the insurance. This phenomenon can be found in many different types of risk transfer arrangements, including banking transactions (e.g., the savings and loan losses of the mid-eighties), stockbroking, demand for medical services by insured patients, and long-term disability "malingering." Many risk transfer contracts include risk sharing provisions that force the risk-advantaged entity to partake in the losses of the risk-disadvantaged entity to an extent commensurate with the expected losses associated with moral hazard. Insurance deductibles, medical co-pays and performancebased commission are all examples of risk-sharing arrangements to counter moral hazard [9] .
In the aerospace industry, cost reserves are intended, ideally, to absorb risks associated with estimating space mission costs years before launch. NASA projects are extremely complex. Estimate uncertainty is an accepted part of the planning process and reserves provide a form of insurance against cost overruns. They protect both NASA and its contracting organizations from mission failure caused by unexpected expenses. However, they may also create incentives akin to moral hazard because both the contracting organization and NASA have less reason to worry about unsustainable cost growth. Since we note that cost growth can occur for reasons within, as well as for reasons outside of a project's control, reserves may lead to increases in spending that are not necessarily associated with unforeseen project risks, but rather with cost deltas that can otherwise be mitigated or avoided.
Consider the following anecdotal example of a h usband and wife planning a kitchen remodeling project. In one scenario, they agree that their budget for the renovation is $20,000, but they plan to set aside $5,000 (25% reserves) to cover unknowns. In a second scenario, their budget is also $20,000, but they do not have any additional funds for overages. In fact, if they go over the $20,000 limit, there is a high likelihood that they will be unable to cover their mortgage payments and risk losing the house. I t is clear that the former example has a much greater chance of overrun than the latter. We contend that the knowledge of reserves could certainly play a role in the spending of reserves.
In order to establish whether mission cost reserves constitute a self-fulfilling prophecy, we need to construct a theory and test it against available data. A theoretical model of reserve spending motivation defines a variable ReserveSpending as a function of total reserves.
ReserveSpending = f(Reserves) (1)
This function has a positive slope; for every dollar reserves available, there is a p ositive probability of spending it.
Finally, the function should be concave down; the probability of spending each incremental dollar of reserves decreases progressively (3).
The first model requirement (1) states that the amount of reserves that a mission spends is a function of the amount of reserves that are available to the mission. The model does not require that reserves are the only factor contributing to reserve spending, as we have already shown above. However, we do hypothesize that the presence or absence of reserves affects the probability of spending beyond initial mission cost estimates. The second model requirement (2) states that the relationship between reserves and reserve spending is positive. Here we hypothesize that larger reserves lead to larger cost increases. The more reserve dollars are made available to cover mission costs, the greater the cost growth associated with the mission. Finally, the third model requirements (3) hypothesizes that cost growth is throttled as reserve dollars are successively spent. As reserves begin to run out, we expect to see slow-down in cost growth. In other words, the first dollar of reserves is the most likely one to be spent on cost increases, and the last dollar of reserves is the least likely.
We first tested the model against available NASA CADRe data. The CADRe "documents the programmatic, technical, and life cycle cost information for Category I and Category II Flight Systems and Ground Support Projects," [9] . Part C of the CADRe provides detailed cost information by NASA WBS, which provided all the data we used for this analysis. For more recent missions, CADRe data are collected at various points in the mission lifecycle from the concept study report to post launch. For missions where these various data points were available, we were able to see the progression of the mission cost estimate from its earliest stages to the final costs given at completion of development.
We tried to examine missions with reserve dollars initially available and missions to which no reserves are applied. We tested whether reserved missions are more likely to experience mission cost growth between successive milestones, and whether larger levels of reserves lead to higher cost overruns. F inally, we tested whether reserve spending slows as reserve dollars are depleted.
DATA COLLECTION, NORMALIZATION AND ANALYSIS
We examined available CADRe data to collect a data set on which to test our hypothesis. The challenge was, as always, getting consistent, reliable data. Several requirements for our data set were:
1. Missions included require both a PDR CADRe and a Launch CADRe.
2. Cost data are required for total mission, spacecraft, payload, program management and systems engineering.
3. Launch vehicle costs must be identified.
Reserves must be identified.
Anomalous data were identified where the above requirements were not met, or where specific mission characteristics precluded their inclusion in our data set (e.g., missing cost data from partner organizations, etc.). These missions were excluded from our analysis. The final data set included 13 d ata points for the missions listed in Table 1 . We defined total cost overrun (which can be negative) as the change in mission cost between Critical Design Review (CDR) and launch, excluding reserves and launch vehicle. Since we also collected various WBS elements in isolation, we defined cost increases for program management, systems engineering, spacecraft, and payload similarly, as the change in reported costs for each of these WBS elements between PDR and launch. Reserves were defined as given by the CADRe in a separate line item (sometimes referred to as "contingency").
Upon finalization of the data set, it became clear that the first part of our hypothesis, reserved missions are more likely to experience cost overruns than unreserved missions, would not be testable using available CADRe data. All of the missions in our data set had reserves at PDR. We were unable to find an example of a mission with CADRes at both PDR and launch for which the cost estimate did not set aside reserves at PDR.
The next part of our hypothesis, however, was testable. We examined whether mission cost increases correlate positively with reserve levels. A first look at total mission cost increase as a p ercentage of PDR cost estimate (excluding reserves and launch vehicle) against reserve percentage revealed no statistical significance (r squared was 0.012) (Figure 2) . We encountered similarly inconclusive findings for spacecraft (Figure 3 We next examined whether total dollars spent bore a positive relationship with total dollars reserved for each of the cost groups. Findings demonstrated strong positive correlation between total mission cost increases and total dollars reserved, as shown in Figure 7 , where r-squared reached 0.62. The same was true for hardware cost increases, as shown for spacecraft in Figure 8 , and for payload in Figure 9 . No strong relationship could be found between reserved dollars and cost increases in program management ( Figure 11 ) and systems engineering ( Figure 12 ). Having established a strong positive relationship between total dollars of mission cost increase and total dollars of reserves, we tested the third part of our hypothesis. The question was whether there is evidence that cost increases tend to slow down as reserve dollars are used up. We examined cost increases as a p ercentage of mission reserves for each of the categories, total mission, spacecraft, payload, program management, and systems engineering. Immediately, we encountered a problem with our hypothesis: within our data set, only one mission had total cost increase within the value of the reserves reported at PDR. All twelve other missions spent as much or more than their reserves over the PDR estimate. There did not appear to be evidence that mission cost increases are throttled as reserves run out. However, since the relationship between spacecraft and payload cost increases and reserve levels were also strong, we tested the hypothesis on these two categories in isolation as well. Results were surprising.
We generated a g raph showing spacecraft cost increases as a p ercentage of PDR reserves in order from smallest percentage increase (-11%) to largest percentage increase (229%) (Figure 13 ). The graph shows that spacecraft costs were increasing at an increasing rate, exactly the opposite of our hypothesis. However, upon closer examination of the graph, we discovered two groups of cost increases which were behaving differently.
1. For missions whose spacecraft increases were less than or equal to reserves (eight total missions), cost increases were behaving as we expected. That is, they were increasing at a decreasing rate. On Figure 13 , note that as spacecraft costs as a percentage of total reserves approach 1, the bars level off, showing that spending for these missions was slowing down. 2. For missions whose spacecraft cost increases exceeded reserves (five total missions), the spending appears to increase at an increasing rate. Figure 13 shows that the data is increasing faster and faster for all the bars over 100%.
To illustrate this, we separated the data into two groupings, shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15 . We tested for a similar pattern with payload cost increases and were unable to establish a similar relationship conclusively. It is interesting to note, however, that payload cost increases also seem to show two separate groupings, those that experience cost increases less than total reserves, and those that experience cost increases greater than total reserves (Figure 16 ). 
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Although it is impossible to tell from our limited data set whether the existence of mission cost reserves increases the likelihood of mission cost increases, it is clear from this quantitative research that the amount of mission cost reserves correlates strongly with the amount of mission cost increases. This relationship is also strong between dollars of mission reserves and dollars of spacecraft and payload cost increase.
Furthermore, although the third part of our hypothesis, that mission cost increases will slow as reserve dollars are successively spent (3) was disproved by our data set, it appears that a qualified version of this part of our hypothesis may yet be valid. For missions where spacecraft cost overruns remain within the amount of mission reserve dollars, overspending does, in fact, appear to be throttled as the spacecraft cost increases approach the total of reserves. However, for missions where spacecraft cost increases exceed total dollars of reserves, spending actually increases at an increasing rate, once reserve dollars are used up.
If we confine our analysis to spacecraft cost increases, the question remains whether the relationship between overspending and reserves is causal. In order to test this, we need to examine the application of reserve dollars across NASA institutions and investigate the chronology of reserve draw-down. To support the conclusion that the availability of reserves actually causes mission cost increases, we must explore whether "extra" dollars are used to solve project problems as they emerge, to mitigate mission risks, to correct for poorly estimated mission costs at each milestone or to "gold-plate" a project as it nears its completion.
Although this level of analysis is beyond the scope of this paper (or, more pertinently, it is beyond the scope of our available data set), we will embark on this study in the future. For further analysis, we will expand our data sources to include CADRe Part A resources to find qualitative information about the missions studied. Some of the evidence given in this paper already points to the conclusion that the amount of cost reserves does, indeed, bear a cau sal relationship with the amount of cost overruns, particularly for spacecraft and payload. Assuming this is the case, how can we change reserves policies and practices to reduce the likelihood of generating incentives to overspend?
One solution may be to alter reserve policies so that reserves are calculated as a f unction of overall mission risk, rather than setting reserves at a fixed percentage of total costs, independent of the specific characteristics that cause a mission to be more or less likely to use reserve dollars. Since reserves are intended to mitigate cost risk, they must be understood in terms of probability and variability. It is reasonable to calculate them as a whole, in terms of some measure of variability of the distribution of summed WBS costs, rather than to calculate them individually by WBS, thus earmarking each dollar of reserves. In light of the expectation that WBS elements within a total mission cost are often correlated with each other, it is important to note that the sum of the most likely outcomes (modes) of the individual cost distributions associated with each WBS element does not equal the mode of the distribution of summed costs as shown in (4) [11] , for right-skewed distributions.
What is commonly referred to as the "most likely" outcome of the distribution of mission costs is often significantly lower than the true mode when correlation is taken into account.
Assuming the goal is to achieve 70% percent confidence that sufficient funds will be available to complete a mission, it makes sense to calculate reserves as the difference between the 70 th percentile of the cumulative distribution function of total mission costs and the most likely outcome (mode) of total mission costs (5).
Reserves ≡ F 0.75 (TotalMissionCosts) -f mode (TotalMissionCosts) (5)
This allows cost estimators to calculate mission costs as the outcome of the cost distribution that has the highest probability of occurring, and to quantify cost risk as the dollar amount required to achieve an adequate level of confidence in the mission's viability. This is not necessarily a novel approach. Statistical cost estimating techniques for space missions rely on extremely sparse data sets with broad definitions of similar mission characteristics. For example, in order to achieve a r easonably broad sample for this paper, we define our data set as NASA missions launched since 2004 with at least two CADRe data entries. For this paper, as well as for any analysis used to estimate expected mission costs, the cost distributions are therefore often heavily right-skewed with very fat tails. With this type of data, measures of expected value are often estimated from the median or the mode of the distribution, rather than from its mean [12] . Adding an uncertainty component equal to the distance from the measure of central tendency to a particular percentile of the cumulative distribution function is a commonly used method of mitigating risk in insurance pricing.
We have shown that reserve spending is currently (at least in part) a f unction of reserves. We have also provided strong evidence that reserve spending can actually be caused by the presence of reserves. We offer a possible solution in the form of redefining reserves as a function of cost risk. That is, a project should directly assess Technology Readiness Level (TRL), complexity of missions, process maturity levels and institutional competencies. But how does this align incentives so that organizations are less likely to use reserves? B y institutionalizing this approach, we can examine if reserves are less likely to be spent in this project formation. Limited data availability inhibits the complete study of whether knowledge of reserve levels can cause a different spending behavior. B ut, if a project (and stakeholders) estimate reserve necessity based purely on the critical elements listed above, projects can then generate a meaningful reserve assessment.
